Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Explained: How ARC Fixes SPF, DKIM & DMARC Failures on Forwarded Email

Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) is an email authentication protocol, defined in RFC 8617, that lets intermediaries such as forwarders, mailing lists and security gateways record the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results they saw and cryptographically seal them into the message. A later receiver can then trust those results even after forwarding has broken SPF or DKIM.

With Microsoft, Google and Yahoo now enforcing DMARC on inbound mail, ARC is what stops legitimate forwarded mail from being rejected or quarantined. This post explains how ARC works, walks through a real three-hop ARC chain, and gives you a PowerShell function to decode ARC headers from any message.


Why Forwarding Breaks SPF, DKIM and DMARC

Indirect mail flow means the message doesn't travel straight from the sender's server to the recipient's server. Common examples:

  • Mailbox or account forwarding (for example Microsoft 365 → Gmail → Zoho)
  • Mailing lists that add a footer or [List] subject tag
  • Third-party email security gateways that rewrite URLs or add banners

Each of these can break authentication:

CheckWhy it fails after forwarding
SPFThe forwarder sends from its own IP, which isn't in the original domain's SPF record (unless the forwarder rewrites the envelope sender with SRS)
DKIMChanging the subject, body or footer invalidates the original signature
DMARCDMARC needs SPF or DKIM to pass and align with the From: domain. If both break, DMARC fails and p=reject causes a bounce

How ARC Solves It

ARC Chain of Custody Across Three Hops
Hop 1 · i=1
Microsoft 365 (Sender)
  • SPF, DKIM, DMARC = pass
  • Seals results, cv=none (first in chain)
Hop 2 · i=2
Gmail (Forwarder)
  • Validates the i=1 seal: arc=pass
  • Adds its own seal, cv=pass
Hop 3 · i=3
Zoho (Final Receiver)
  • Validates the full chain i=1 → i=2
  • Trusts the original DMARC pass, delivers to Inbox

Every ARC-participating server adds one ARC set, made of three headers that share the same instance number i=:

HeaderPurposeKey tags
ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR)A snapshot of the SPF / DKIM / DMARC / ARC results this hop sawi=, spf=, dkim=, dmarc=, arc=
ARC-Message-Signature (AMS)A DKIM-like signature over the message as this hop received iti=, d=, s=, h=, bh=, b=
ARC-Seal (AS)Signs all previous ARC sets, so nobody can tamper with the chaini=, d=, s=, cv=, b=
The cv= (chain validation) tag in each ARC-Seal holds that hop's verdict on the chain before it:
  • cv=none — no earlier ARC sets (always the case for i=1)
  • cv=pass — all earlier ARC sets validated
  • cv=fail — the chain is broken. Every later hop must also record fail, and receivers should ignore the chain
Important: ARC does not override DMARC on its own. It gives the receiver evidence. The receiver decides whether to trust the sealer, based on its own reputation data or an admin-configured list of trusted ARC sealers.

Walking Through a Real 3-Hop ARC Chain

I sent a test message from Microsoft 365 (lab365.in) to Gmail, which auto-forwarded it to Zoho Mail. The final message contained three ARC sets.

Instance 1: Microsoft 365 seals the original results

TEXT
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none;
  b=hHKv1LH/q7QPDa9zHQkK7AsDZpH527MaIpo6cdQbnsxr6NWp9ywYAPruYV78nEgl...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;
  s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version;
  bh=JLqRj4hQ3j4my5ikpnsfqaeCAL5Ne00fEMqbrTD4h/4=;
  b=BD5niXEk/wUbcitOLIbm9Kec7nYro0e2lbK+3aQOdlxeIPrMdRNXttekUbcV/...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass
  smtp.mailfrom=lab365.in; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=lab365.in;
  dkim=pass header.d=lab365.in; arc=none

mx.microsoft.com recorded SPF, DKIM and DMARC as pass. Because it's the first hop, both cv=none and arc=none.

Instance 2: Gmail validates hop 1 and adds its own seal

TEXT
ARC-Seal: i=2; a=rsa-sha256; t=1640770738; cv=pass; d=google.com;
  s=arc-20160816; b=aygLwXdcqgcZtrtMEuqeytWxoiLDaym+Pw80j2czWjCLs1KxzNHerpc63DqjL5YcGY...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=2; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com;
  s=arc-20160816; h=mime-version:content-language:accept-language...;
  b=EJbx2vp+QM/n+eRHI802OkM6wgqurzmpChmBVGEIyOw3T7dm8GnN8W5E4hPBbGehxS...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=2; mx.google.com;
  dkim=pass [email protected] header.s=selector2 header.b=pCmfPmVw;
  spf=pass (google.com: domain of [email protected] designates
  2a01:111:f400:fea4::61f as permitted sender) [email protected];
  dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=lab365.in;
  arc=pass (i=1 spf=pass spfdomain=lab365.in dkim=pass dkdomain=lab365.in
  dmarc=pass fromdomain=lab365.in)

Gmail verified the i=1 seal (arc=pass (i=1 ...)) and sealed the chain with cv=pass.

Instance 3: Zoho validates the whole chain

TEXT
ARC-Seal: i=3; a=rsa-sha256; t=1640770739; cv=pass; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc;
  b=aT7DKuzcGg5Gi1vT/M1EoehU0ehCFT8RxaX3XXLCFAU9Qgtqhexqw+UGWnsMtIm/...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=3; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com;
  s=zohoarc; t=1640770739; h=Content-Type:Date:From:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Subject:To;
  bh=JLqRj4hQ3j4my5ikpnsfqaeCAL5Ne00fEMqbrTD4h/4=;
  b=XHq/OSi0+YHUBPYZ38XRKZD481b91YY+J8srIOOaSc9gCRTXmWkiSqaamICWb5KoM...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=3; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass;
  spf=pass (zohomail.com: domain of _spf.google.com designates 209.85.160.178
  as permitted sender) [email protected];
  dmarc=pass header.from=<[email protected]> (p=quarantine dis=none);
  arc=pass (i=2 dmarc=pass fromdomain=lab365.in)

Look at the smtp.mailfrom in instance 3. Gmail rewrote the envelope sender (the P1 / MAIL FROM address) to a gmail.com address, so SPF passed against Google's IPs. Microsoft 365 does the same thing with the Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS). The header.from (the P2 address the user sees) stays lab365.in, and DMARC alignment is always checked against that header.

In this test DKIM also survived, so DMARC passed anyway. If Gmail had changed the body and broken DKIM, the i=2 ARC set would be the only proof that the message originally passed DMARC.


Decode Any ARC Chain with PowerShell

Copy the full message headers (Outlook: File → Properties → Internet headers; Outlook on the web: ⋯ → View → View message details) into a text file and run:

POWERSHELL
function Get-ArcTag([string]$Text, [string]$Name) {
    if ($Text -match "(?:^|[;\s])$Name=([^;\s]+)") { $Matches[1] }
}

function Get-ArcChain {
    [CmdletBinding()]
    param (
        [Parameter(Mandatory, ValueFromPipeline)] [string]$HeaderText
    )

    # Unfold folded header lines (RFC 5322: continuation lines start with whitespace)
    $unfolded = $HeaderText -replace "`r?`n[ `t]+", ' '

    $sets = @{}
    foreach ($line in ($unfolded -split "`r?`n")) {
        if ($line -match '^(ARC-Seal|ARC-Message-Signature|ARC-Authentication-Results):\s*(.+)%%%CODEBLOCK_4%%%#39;) {
            $name  = $Matches[1]
            $value = $Matches[2]
            if ($value -match '\bi=\s*(\d+)') {
                $i = [int]$Matches[1]
                if (-not $sets.ContainsKey($i)) { $sets[$i] = @{} }
                $sets[$i][$name] = $value
            }
        }
    }

    foreach ($i in ($sets.Keys | Sort-Object)) {
        $seal = $sets[$i]['ARC-Seal']
        $aar  = $sets[$i]['ARC-Authentication-Results']
        $ams  = $sets[$i]['ARC-Message-Signature']

        [PSCustomObject]@{
            Instance    = $i
            SealedBy    = (Get-ArcTag $seal 'd')
            Selector    = (Get-ArcTag $seal 's')
            ChainStatus = (Get-ArcTag $seal 'cv')
            AuthServ    = (if ($aar -match '^\s*i=\d+;\s*([^;\s]+)') { $Matches[1] })
            SPF         = (Get-ArcTag $aar 'spf')
            DKIM        = (Get-ArcTag $aar 'dkim')
            DMARC       = (Get-ArcTag $aar 'dmarc')
            PriorARC    = (Get-ArcTag $aar 'arc')
            CompleteSet = [bool]($seal -and $aar -and $ams)
        }
    }
}

Get-Content .\headers.txt -Raw | Get-ArcChain | Format-Table -AutoSize

Output for the test message above (tested in Windows PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7):

POWERSHELL
Instance SealedBy      Selector        ChainStatus AuthServ         SPF  DKIM DMARC PriorARC CompleteSet
                              
       1 microsoft.com arcselector9901 none        mx.microsoft.com pass pass pass  none            True
       2 google.com    arc-20160816    pass        mx.google.com    pass pass pass  pass            True
       3 zohomail.com  zohoarc         pass        mx.zohomail.com  pass pass pass  pass            True

How to read it:

  • ChainStatus = fail at any instance → the chain was broken before that hop, so the receiver won't use it.
  • CompleteSet = False → one of the three headers is missing, which also breaks the chain.
  • The first instance where DMARC = pass shows the hop that saw the message before it was changed.
Note: This function reads ARC results. It doesn't re-verify the RSA signatures. To verify cryptographically, use a library such as Python's dkimpy (arcverify) or check the receiver's own Authentication-Results header, which contains its arc=pass/fail verdict.

ARC in Exchange Online (Microsoft 365)

  • Outbound: Exchange Online ARC-seals messages it relays, using d=microsoft.com with selectors like arcselector9901 / arcselector10001.
  • Inbound: Microsoft Defender for Office 365 / EOP validates ARC chains automatically. When DMARC fails but a trusted sealer's ARC set shows a pass, composite authentication can still pass the message. In the receiving Authentication-Results header this shows as compauth=pass reason=130.
  • Trusted ARC sealers: if a third-party gateway (Mimecast, Proofpoint, Barracuda and so on) sits in front of Exchange Online and modifies messages, add its sealing domain as a trusted ARC sealer. Otherwise legitimate mail can fail DMARC. See my step-by-step guide: Configure Trusted ARC Sealers in Exchange Online with Set-ArcConfig.
POWERSHELL
Connect-ExchangeOnline
Get-ArcConfig | Format-List ArcTrustedSealers